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Re´sume´ / abstract
This paper analyzes the effect of urban proximity on rural non-agricultural wages.
Using the 2002 Chinese Household Income Project data, we study the determi-
nants of rural non-agricultural workers’ hourly wages. We find strong evidence
that rural workers close to cities benefit from higher hourly wages, indicating that
there is a spatial differentiation in wages across rural areas. Specifically, workers
living close to cities are paid about 15% more for one hour worked. This is true
even after controlling for living costs, suggesting that urban proximity leads to
higher non-agricultural wages in real terms. We also find that migration enables
remote workers to partially compensate for lower local wages, suggesting that
restrictions on migration hurt remote workers more than other workers.
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1. Introduction
Reforms in China have allowed for a fall of nearly half a billion in the number of poor
people over the past thirty years (World Bank, 2009). However, many rural people remain
poor and poverty is strikingly concentrated in isolated rural areas (World Bank, 1992;
Jalan and Ravallion, 2002). Other studies, both on developed (Pardridge and Rickman,
2008) and developing countries (Bird and Shepherd, 2003), also highlight that poverty
increases with remoteness.
A large strand of the literature argues that non-agricultural employment enables rural
households to get out of poverty. Indeed, non-agricultural work can enable households
both to raise their income and to reduce its instability (Ellis, 1998). This is particularly
true for China, where farm size is extremely small1 and thus, where farmers have few op-
portunities to generate agricultural income. Thanks to the economic reforms implemented
in China over the last thirty years, nowadays, most rural households are involved in some
kind of non-agricultural activity (Liu and Sicular, 2009). However, non-agricultural em-
ployment has developed unevenly across rural areas, leading to a huge increase in intra-
rural inequality (Scott, 1994; Kung and Lee, 2001). More specifically, distance to urban
areas plays a significant role in determining the level of non-agricultural employment. As
peri-urban rural areas benefit from low transport costs and from a significant transmission
of ideas, they benefit from more non-agricultural employment opportunities than areas
further away from cities (Henderson et al., 2001). This has been demonstrated specifically
for China (Knight and Song, 2003; de Janvry et al., 2005) and also for several other de-
veloping countries (Corral and Reardon, 2001; Ferreira and Lanjouw, 2001; Micevska and
Rahut, 2008; Winters et al. 2009; Deichmann et al., 2009; Jonasson and Helfand, 2010).
The present work aims at studying more deeply how remoteness affects non-agricultural
employment by investigating whether remote workers are trapped in low-paid non-agricultural
jobs. Therefore, unlike previous studies, the discussion here is not about the level but
about the kind of non-agricultural employment that remote workers manage to get. Look-
ing at this issue in China is particularly relevant for three reasons. First, given the in-
1The arable land area in China is far below the world average as it was only 0.11 hectare per capita
in 2000 (Tan et al., 2005).
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stitutional restrictions on labor mobility (hukou)2, local conditions play a very significant
role in determining rural workers’ earnings and well-being (Xia and Simmons, 2004).
Second, if on average non-agricultural activities are much more income-generating than
agricultural activities3, there is a huge variation in the remuneration of non-agricultural
wage-employment. There are even low-paid non-agricultural jobs where earnings are lower
than agricultural earnings (Lanjouw, 1999), so that one cannot assume a priori that non-
agricultural employment enables workers to raise their income. Third, it has been recog-
nized that there are persistent spatial differences in wages, especially between workers in
urban areas and workers in remote areas (Hanson, 2000).
According to the 2002 and 2007 Chinese Household Income Project (CHIP) surveys,
there are both high differences in wages across rural areas and high differences in wages
between suburban villages and other villages in China. On the one hand, in 2002 the
average daily wage4 was 2.5 times higher in the ninth decile than in the first decile. Even
if the gap narrowed slightly5 from 2002 to 2007, the average daily wage was still two
times higher in the ninth decile than in the first decile in 2007. This data shows that
intra-rural wage inequality and intra-urban wage inequality are of comparable magnitude
(see Combes et al. (2012) for data on intra-urban wage inequality). On the other hand,
suburban villages benefit from higher wages, as the average daily wage in these villages
was about 1.25 higher than in other villages.
In spite of these spatial variations in wages in rural China, to our knowledge, no
empirical evidence exists on the effect of urban proximity on rural non-agricultural wages
in China6, although there is some empirical evidence for other developing countries. On
the one hand, non-agricultural earnings tend to be higher in rural areas closer to urban
2For a review of the hukou system, see Chan and Buckingham (2008).
3Wage-employment is estimated to be paid more than twice, and self-employment three to five times
as much as agricultural work in China (Kung, 2002).
4The average daily wage refers to the daily wage for temporary workers who perform local labor in
towns and villages.
5Note that the 2002 and 2007 CHIP surveys were not carried out in the same villages so that the
narrowing in wage differentials could be lead by differences in villages surveyed between 2002 and 2007.
6Most studies focus on spatial differences in wages in urban China (Hering and Poncet, 2010; Combes
et al., 2012).
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centers and roads (Corral and Reardon, 2001; de Janvry and Sadoulet, 2001; Micevska and
Rahut, 2008). However, these studies estimate the determinants of annual non-agricultural
earnings which depend on both the intensity of participation in the non-agricultural sector
and on the hourly wage. As urban proximity increases the intensity of participation in
the non-agricultural sector (Knight and Song, 2003), one cannot infer from these studies
that workers close to urban areas are paid higher wages. On the other hand, others assess
whether workers closer to cities have a higher probability of being involved in high-paid7
jobs and find mixed evidence. Deichmann et al. (2009) estimates that high-paid jobs
are concentrated in rural areas surrounding urban centers in Bangladesh. In contrast,
Jonasson and Helfand (2010) find that there is no clear relation, as both high-paid and
low-paid jobs are concentrated around urban agglomerations.
In China, non-agricultural wages are likely to be lower in remote rural areas. First, the
type of industry varies across rural areas, and high-return sectors are more likely to con-
centrate in suburban areas. Indeed, in areas located far away from cities, non-agricultural
employment often consists of small scale manufactures that specialize in modest articles.
On the contrary, in areas close to cities, the production is much more technologically
sophisticated and is tied to urban production, through subcontracting and technical as-
sistance to urban firms (Naughton, 2007). Second, nowadays Chinese suburban areas are
highly urbanized with a high level of industrial development, densely concentrated indus-
tries and competitive industrial clusters, so that they are very similar to cities (Naughton,
2007). Suburban villages are therefore likely to benefit from some kinds of agglomeration
economies, leading to higher labor productivity and so, to higher real wages8. However,
the huge labor surplus in rural China could also impede wages from rising close to urban
areas. Moreover, most of the production in rural industries is intensive in low-skilled
labor so that human capital externalities may not be significant, limiting the scope of
agglomeration economies. As a result, one cannot say a priori whether or not rural areas
closer to cities benefit from higher wages - this issue requires an empirical assessment.
7Non-agricultural jobs are high-paid if the hourly wage falls above the earnings of wage laborers in
agriculture.
8Duranton and Puga (2004) present the theoretical micro-foundations of agglomeration economies and
Rosenthal and Strange (2004) review the empirical literature on agglomeration economies.
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Using the 2002 rural survey of the Chinese Household Income Project, we estimate the
determinants of hourly wages, controlling both for the potential selection bias and for a
range of characteristics at the individual and village levels.
We find that remote workers suffer both from scarcer opportunities to work out of
agriculture locally and from lower local wages. Specifically, workers in suburban villages
are paid about 15% more for one hour worked. Moreover, the result holds even after
controlling for differences in living costs between suburban and other areas, which suggests
that urban proximity leads to higher wages in real terms. We also find that migration
enables remote workers to partially compensate for lower local wages, suggesting that
restrictions on migration hurt remote workers more than other workers.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 presents the data and Section 3
the methodology used. We describe the results in Section 4 and finally, we conclude and
propose some policy recommendations in Section 5.
2. Data
To carry out the empirical analysis, we use the 2002 rural survey of the Chinese
Household Income Project9. This survey was conducted by the Chinese Academy of Social
Sciences and investigates households’ conditions in 2002. The database is composed both
of an individual, a household and a village level survey. Thus, we benefit from detailed
information on individual labor allocation and from household and village characteristics.
In addition, this is a nationally representative survey which investigates 37,969 individuals
of 9,200 households from 961 villages belonging to 122 counties (xia`n) of 22 provinces10.
As a result, we benefit from a huge variability in terms of remoteness-proximity to urban
areas, contrary to most micro-economic studies.
9A detailed description of the data can be found in Gustafson et al. (2008). We do not use the 2007
CHIP survey as there is no detailed information on rural non-agricultural work to calculate hourly wages.
10The ”province” and the ”county” correspond respectively to the first and third levels of administrative
division in China. The sample includes the provinces of Beijing, Hebei, Shanxi, Liaoning, Jilin, Jiangsu,
Zhejiang, Anhui, Jiangxi, Shandong, Henan, Hubei, Hunan, Guangdong, Guangxi, Chongqing, Sichuan,
Guizhou, Yunnan, Shaanxi, Gansu and Xinjiang.
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2.1. Labor Allocation of Rural Workers
We restrict the CHIP sample to workers. Every individual above 15 years old who
reports having earned some income or having spent some time working is considered as
a worker. We further distinguish between agricultural workers (those who work on-farm
or as a farm-employee) and non-agricultural workers (those who work out of agriculture).
Non-agricultural workers are composed of wage-earners and self-employed workers. Here
we focus on non-agricultural wage-earners because most information on labor time and
earnings for self-employment is not available at the individual level. Note that wage-
employment represents the bulk of rural non-agricultural employment in China (de Brauw
et al., 2002; Mohapatra et al., 2007). Finally, non-agricultural wage-earners are composed
both of local workers and migrants. Following Zhao (1999) and de la Rupelle et al. (2009),
in order to include commuters, local wages earners are defined as people working in their
home county. Most migrants are working in a city because migration from one rural area
to another is very low in China11. To study whether there is a spatial differentiation in
wages, we focus on local non-agricultural wages.
Table 1 presents data on the labor allocation of workers in the sample. Our sample is
composed of 25,116 workers. 8,414 of them are non-agricultural wage-earners and 5,325
are non-agricultural wage-earners working locally12. According to the data, a significant
share of the labor-force (39%) is involved in some kind of non-agricultural work, which
is very consistent with previous findings (de Brauw et al., 2002; Knight and Song, 2003;
Shi et al., 2007). In addition, nearly one-third of workers is diversified, as they work
both in and out of agriculture. Finally, given land rights reallocation and the scarcity of
non-agricultural jobs in rural China, a large share of the labor force remains in agriculture
(especially on-farm).
11According to 2007 Chinese Household Income Project data, more than 90% of migrant rural workers
leave their local countryside to work in towns or cities.
12On the 37,969 individuals surveyed, 7,869 are children and 30,100 are adults. 26,065 adults are
workers and 4,035 are inactive. However, we have missing information on place of work, labor time
and/or wage for 949 workers so that our sample is composed of 25,116 workers. Finally, there are 2464
individuals for whom explanatory variables are missing. As a result, the estimates are undertaken on a
sample of 22,652 workers.
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[Table 1]
2.2. Dependent Variable: Non-agricultural Hourly Wages
To study whether spatial differences in wages exist between remote rural areas and
other ones, we estimate the determinants of individual non-agricultural hourly wage
(NAHW). This variable is calculated using information on wages and labor time for
non-agricultural wage earners. To ensure robustness, we calculate the individual non-
agricultural hourly wage in two ways. First, we consider both an individual’s primary and









where k refers to the non-agricultural wage employment of individual i (k = 0 if the indi-
vidual is a full-time agricultural worker; k = 1 if the individual has one non-agricultural
wage activity and k = 2 if the individual is engaged in non-agricultural wage-employment
both as a primary and secondary activity). Wki are the annual earnings
13 of individual
i derived by working in activity k; Dki is the number of days worked during the year in
activity k and Hki the number of hours worked per day in activity k.
Second, we follow Deichmann et al. (2009) and only consider an individual’s primary




2.3. Variable of Interest: Remoteness from Urban Centers
When measuring distance to urban centers, two elements must be considered: (1) how
to measure distance? (2) Whether or not different urban centers can have varying impacts.
As Bird and Sheperd (2003) highlight, remoteness can result from physical distance
(number of kilometers) and/or from frictional distance (due to bad road quality or natural
conditions such as mountainous areas or floods). To take into account both of these
13Following Hering and Poncet (2010) and De´murger et al. (2012), it includes the basic wage, bonuses,
in-kind earnings and subsidies and pension income.
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dimensions, distance is sometimes measured by travel time (Jacoby, 2000; Fafchamps and
Shilpi, 2003). However, travel time indicators may suffer from endogeneity14 so that other
studies prefer using indicators of physical distance (Deichamnn et al., 2009).
In addition, the effect of urban centers on rural non-agricultural employment is ex-
pected to vary according to their size. In Nepal, for example, rural household’ labor
allocation is affected both by the distance to city and by the population of the city: big-
ger cities tend to have a higher impact (Fafchamps and Shilpi, 2003). In the same way,
other studies distinguish between major urban centers and other urban municipalities
(Deichmann et al., 2009) or between rural towns and cities (de Janvry and Sadoulet,
2001; Lanjouw et al., 2001). Thus in China, proximity to the county seat and to the
city significantly increases the number of days worked out of farm whereas proximity to
smaller towns has no effect (Knight and Song, 2003).
Here we use the two different indicators of remoteness that are available in the 2002
CHIP survey: the distance to rural town and the distance to city. On the one hand,
the distance to rural town is measured by the distance, in kilometers, between a worker’s
village and the nearest county seat. On the other hand, the distance to city is measured
by a dummy variable which is equal to 1 if the village is not a suburb of a large or middle
city (jiaoqu) and 0 if it is a suburban village. Thus, these two indicators of interest enable
us to check whether different types of urban areas have a heterogeneous impact. Indeed,
agglomeration economies are likely to be much more bigger in the vicinities of cities, which
are larger, and the economy of which is much less dependant on agriculture than that of
rural towns. Moreover, these indicators are measures of physical distance and not of travel
time, which protects us from endogeneity problems. However, this raises concerns about
the accuracy of the distance measure as it does not take into account frictional distance. To
solve this problem, we introduce two variables to control for frictional distance: a measure
of road access and of the topographical conditions of the village (see Appendices A and B).
As a result, our indicators of interest enable us to estimate the effect of physical remoteness
after controlling for frictional distance. Note that our indicators of interest account both
14Indeed, rural roads are likely to be built where there is a developed non-agricultural sector. As a
result, the placement of roads in these areas reduce the travel time to urban centers, which would lead
to estimation bias.
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for lower transaction costs and for demand-side effects (size of the local market) arising
from urban proximity. In other words, we only test whether urban proximity leads to
higher wages, without assessing which transmission channels lead to higher wages, this
being well beyond the scope of this paper15.
[Table 2]
Table 2 gives descriptive statistics on the hourly wages in yuan according to the dis-
tance to urban areas. According to the table, hourly wages broadly decrease with distance
to county seat. The relation between hourly wages and distance to city seems stronger
given that workers in suburban villages are paid significantly higher hourly wages.
3. Methodology
3.1. Baseline specification
To test whether workers further away from urban centers are paid lower wages, we
estimate an income function. Contrary to previous studies (Corral and Reardon, 2001; de
Janvry and Sadoulet, 2001; Jonasson and Helfand, 2010), to test the effect of distance on
rural non-agricultural earnings, we do not use as dependant variable total non-agricultural
earnings. Indeed, total non-agricultural earnings are determined both by hourly earnings
and by the intensity of participation in the activity. As remoteness significantly reduces
the intensity of participation in non-agricultural activities (Knight and Song, 2003), it
would over-estimate the effect of remoteness on earnings. Therefore, we use as dependant
variable the individual non-agricultural hourly wage (NAHW) presented in Section 2.2.
As not every rural worker derives income from non-agricultural wage-employment,
we estimate the two-step Heckman selection model (Heckman, 1979) in order to correct
for the potential selection bias. The first step consists in estimating a probit model of
participation in non-agricultural wage-employment (selection model). In the second step,
15Very few empirical studies on rural non-agricultural earnings separately assess the different effects
arising from urban proximity. A notable exception is Jonasson and Helfand (2010) who use a collection
of variables to separately estimate demand-side effects and transaction costs effects.
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we estimate an augmented Mincerian hourly earnings function (Mincer, 1974) by the
Ordinary Least Squares:




v + δXi + ζXv + γλi + εi (1)
where i refers to the worker and v to the village. DistT and DistC are respectively distance
to the nearest rural town and distance to city, our two indicators of interest. ε is the error
term, β, δ and ζ are vectors of unknown coefficients, associated with the explanatory
variables, which must be estimated. We control for variables both at the individual (Xi)
and village (Xv) levels. As control variables, we follow the literature and introduce a set
of characteristics which are expected to affect the level of non-agricultural hourly wage
(Li, 2003; Hering and Poncet, 2010; De´murger et al., 2012). We control for worker’s
age and its square, education, experience and its square, gender and dummy variables to
control whether the worker is from an ethnic minority and whether he is a member of the
Communist Party. Controlling for individual characteristics, we address the issue that
workers may sort spatially according to their characteristics16 (Combes et al., 2008). In
this way, we are able to clearly separate the effect of location variables from the effect of
workers characteristics.
We introduce two more variables, at the village level, to control for frictional distance
as discussed in Section 2.3.: a dummy variable to control for the topography of the
village (plain, hilly area or mountainous area) and a dummy variable indicating whether
or not a road reaches the village. Province and regional (East, Center, West) dummies are
introduced to control for differences in development, living costs, endowments and policies.
In addition, as wages are expected to be lower in poorer areas, we introduce a dummy
variable indicating whether the village is in a province level poverty township. Finally,
to correct for the potential sample selection bias, the inverse Mills ratio λ, generated
from the 1st step probit model, is introduced among the determinants of income. If λ
is significant, it indicates that common factors influence both the participation in the
non-agricultural sector and the hourly wage earned from this sector, so that the errors
16Note that we also partially address the issue of the spatial sorting of workers, carrying out the analysis
on the sample of local workers.
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of the two equations are correlated. The Heckman selection model, by introducing the
inverse Mills ratio among the determinants of income, enables us to take into account this
correlation and thus, leads to consistent estimations. As identifying restriction17, we use
the quantity of land per capita in the worker’s household. Indeed, this should decrease
rural workers participation in the non-agricultural sector without affecting the wage level.
Definition and descriptive statistics of the variables are given in Appendices A and B.
3.2. Controlling for higher living costs close to urban centers
In equation (1) we control for differences in living costs by introducing provincial
dummies. However, living costs are also likely to vary within a given province, and
especially between remote rural areas and other ones. As wages are expected to be an
increasing function of living costs, and as living costs are expected to be higher close to
urban areas, the coefficient associated with the variables of interest could be over-estimated
(Hering and Poncet, 2010).
To control for differences in living costs between remote and other areas, we calculate
an index of living costs at the village level. The index is calculated using information on
the market price, in yuan per kg, of six non-staple foods18 (meat, eggs, edible oil, sugar,
vegetables, fruit and melons). As a result, we further analyze the effect of urban proximity
on hourly wages by adding the index of living costs among the determinants of income:




v + ηLCv + δXi + ζXv + γλi + εi (2)
where LC refers to the index of living costs at the village level. As the higher the living
costs are, the higher the wage should be, we expect η to be positive.
17The identification of the Mills ratio implies that all the explanatory variables in the income function
must be included in the selection model. In addition, at least one explanatory variable must be introduced
in the selection model but not in the income model.
18We do not use information on the market prices of fish and shellfish because of too many missing
values. Moreover, market prices of non-staple foods are reported at the household level. As market prices
are likely to vary across villages and to avoid measurement errors, we construct an index at the village
level. First, for each of the six non-staple foods, we calculate the average of its market price at the village
level. Second, we create the living cost index by averaging the market price of the six non-staple foods.
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4. Results
4.1. Are there spatial differences in wages in rural China?
Table 3 presents the estimation results of equation (1) (estimations (1) and (3)) and
equation (2) (estimations (2) and (4)) for local non-agricultural wage-earner. As explained
in Section 2.2, we calculate the worker’s non-agricultural hourly wage in two different ways:
first, we consider both a worker’s primary and secondary occupation (estimations (1) and
(2)) and second, we only consider the worker’s primary occupation (estimations (3) and
(4)).
The inverse Mills ratio is significant in all estimations, suggesting that the Heckman
selection model is appropriate. A simple OLS estimation of the income function, without
correction for the sample selection, would have led to biased estimates. Regarding the
determinants of participation in non-agricultural wage-employment (selection model), the
results are consistent with previous findings (Zhao, 1999; Xia and Simmons, 2004; Guang
and Zheng, 2005; Liu and Sicular, 2009; De´murger et al., 2010). Educated workers,
men and party members have a higher probability of working out of agriculture as wage
earners. Moreover, participation in non-agricultural activities decreases with land holdings
and is lower in poor townships. Finally, our results confirm that workers closer to urban
areas benefit from a higher probability of being involved in the non-agricultural sector, as
estimated by Knight and Song (2003) and de Janvry et al. (2005).
Turning to the income equation, it appears that, as for urban areas (Li, 2003; Hering
and Poncet, 2010; De´murger et al., 2012), hourly wages in rural China are an increasing
function of a worker’s age, education and experience. Men and party members also benefit
from higher wages. Regarding our two indicators of interest, remote workers are paid lower
wages. The result is particularly robust for workers living in the vicinity of a middle or
a large city given that the coefficient is significant at the 1% level in all fourth cases.
Specifically, workers not living in a suburban rural areas are paid from 12.5% to 15.8%
less for one hour worked. Regarding the distance to rural town, a 1-kilometer increase
in the distance to the county seat decreases hourly wage by 0.2%. However, the result is
not so strong for rural towns given that the coefficient is not significant in estimation (2).
This is not surprising given that agglomeration economies are likely to be much stronger
in the vicinity of cities where population, population density and industrial density are
14
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higher than in towns. Controlling for the higher living costs due to urban proximity does
not change the results. Workers are paid more where living costs are higher and, as living
costs are higher close to urban areas, this leads to a small decrease in the coefficient
associated with the indicators of interest. However, the coefficients remain negative and
statistically significant. This suggests that spatial differences in real wages exist across
rural areas, according to their distance to urban areas. Finally, the results regarding
frictional distance variables (road and topography) are broadly relevant. As for physical
distance, wages decrease with frictional distance. Indeed, participation and wages are
significantly higher in villages linked by a road. In addition, living in a mountainous area
has a negative, but not robust, effect on wages.
[Table 3]
4.2. Robustness Checks: controlling for endowments
Differences in regional characteristics are one major source of spatial differences in
wages, as endowments, such as a favorable climate, can affect workers’ productivity (Han-
son, 2000). Endowments not only refer to natural conditions (climate, natural resources)
but also include institutions and technology (Combes et al. 2008). Moreover, endowments
are one major source of spatial agglomeration, so that they may be correlated with our
indicators of urban proximity, leading to estimation bias. According to Hering and Poncet
(2010), endowments are likely to vary across Chinese provinces so that provincial dummies
should control for such differences. However, to ensure robustness, we successively carry
out two more tests to control for endowments. First, we estimate equation (2) substitut-
ing provincial dummies with county level dummies. Second, we follow Fally et al. (2010)
and estimate equation (2) by excluding of our analysis sectors which depend on natural
resources19.
Estimation results are reported in Table 4. Introducing other controls for endowments
does not change the findings given that the coefficients associated with the indicators of
remoteness remains negative and significant (in fact, the magnitude of the coefficients even
19Specifically, these workers are no longer considered as wage-earners (their hourly wage is set to zero)
and are part of the censored observations.
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increases). These robustness checks confirm that results are not driven by differences in
endowments and that the closer to urban areas, the higher the hourly wages.
[Table 4]
4.3. Does migration enable remote workers to compensate for lower wages?
Until now, we have tested for spatial differences in wages across rural areas so that we
have only considered local workers’ wages. However, non-agricultural employment is com-
posed both of local and migratory work, the latter being a very significant component of
rural non-agricultural work in China (de Brauw et al., 2002; Shi et al., 2007)20. It has been
shown that migratory work has traditionally been better paid than local non-agricultural
work (Zhao, 1999; Guang and Zheng, 2005). Moreover, Chinese remote workers, who have
scarcer opportunities to work out of agriculture locally, would be more likely to migrate
than workers close to urban areas (Knight and Song, 2003). Thus, migration could be a
way for remote workers to get access to better paid non-agricultural jobs. In this case,
even if wages are higher in rural areas close to cities, remote workers could compensate by
migrating more to cities. Finally, what really matters in terms of well-being is to check
whether remote workers are, on average, paid lower-wages21. To test whether, and to what
extent, remote workers manage to compensate for lower local wages through migration,
we estimate equation (2) on the whole sample of rural non-agricultural wage-earners. As
it has been shown that remote workers migrate more and that migration is better paid,
we expect the coefficients associated with the variables of interest to decrease and/or to
lose their significance.
The results are reported in Table 5. Several interesting results can be found when
considering both local and migrant wage-earners. First of all, regarding the determi-
nants of participation, the coefficients associated with the variable male increases whereas
20This is confirmed in our sample in which a large proportion of non-agricultural workers are migrants
(considering individuals’ primary occupation, around 30% of non-agricultural workers are migrants).
21Note, however, that beyond the question of earnings, migration leads to many costs such as separation
with family and inferior work and living conditions in cities (Zhao, 1999; Guang and Zheng, 2005). As a
result, migration is very often a ”second best” choice for Chinese rural workers who prefer to work locally,
even for lower wages, rather than to migrate to urban areas.
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the sign associated with age begins negative. This confirms that migration is mainly
composed of young men. In addition, in the selection model, the coefficients of interest
decrease and are insignificant in two cases. Thus, when considering both migratory and
local non-agricultural rural workers, location variables are less significant determinants
of participation than when one only considers local work. In other words, remote rural
workers, who face scarcer opportunities to work out of agriculture locally, do engage more
in migration than workers closer to cities. These results highlight that the determinants
of participation vary according to the category of non-agricultural work considered as
estimated by Shi et al. (2007).
Second, turning to the income equation, location variables are less important deter-
minants of wages when considering both migrants and local workers. On the one hand,
the coefficient associated with rural town is insignificant in all cases. By migrating more,
remote workers manage to compensate for the difference in remuneration they suffer in
comparison to that of workers closer to rural towns. On the other hand, both the mag-
nitude and the level of significance of the coefficient associated with distance to city
decreases. However, the coefficient remains negative and significant in every fourth cases
which suggests that, even when migration is taken into account, rural workers living close
to cities benefit from higher real wages. Thus, workers far away from cities only manage
to compensate partially for lower local wages by migrating more than workers closer to
urban areas.
These results underline that restrictions on migration hurt remote workers more than
other workers because they suffer both from fewer opportunities to work out of agriculture
locally and from lower wages.
[Table 5]
5. Conclusion
Since the beginning of the economic reforms, rural workers have diversified out of
agriculture, which has enabled most of them to get out of poverty. However, not all
workers benefit from these new employment opportunities. Besides, one major source of
the rise of intra-rural inequality is the uneven development of non-agricultural activities
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across rural areas. More specifically, non-agricultural work is concentrated in rural areas
surrounding urban centers. Previous studies focus on the nexus between rural workers’
location and their participation in non-agricultural employment. This paper attempts to
study more deeply how remoteness affects non-agricultural employment by investigating
whether remote workers engaged in different types of non-agricultural work and particu-
larly in poorly remunerated jobs. In this way, we try to provide additional explanations
for why poverty is concentrated in remote rural areas. This issue is particularly relevant
for China, where birthplace still plays a significant role in determining an individual’s
place of work, earnings and well-being.
Contrary to previous studies on rural non-agricultural earnings, we do not estimate
the determinants of annual non-agricultural wages, which depend on both the intensity of
participation in the non-agricultural sector and on the hourly wage. As urban proximity
increases the intensity of participation in non-agricultural work, it would over-estimate
the effect of urban proximity on earnings. As a result, we estimate the determinants of
non-agricultural hourly wage, controlling for a broad set of individual and village level
characteristics. We find that remote workers are paid lower real wages. The result is
particularly strong for workers who reside far away from cities. By demonstrating that
non-agricultural wages vary according to the distance from urban centers, we shed addi-
tional light on intra-rural inequality and on the geographic repartition of poverty in China.
In this context, rural development policies not only must pay attention to the individual
determinants of job access and earnings but also to their spatial determinants, in order
to reduce poverty and inequality in rural China.
In addition, we find that remote workers manage to compensate, at least partially, for
lower local wages by migrating more than workers closer to urban areas. This last result
highlights that restrictions on migration hurt remote workers more than other workers
because they suffer from scarcer opportunities to work out of agriculture and are paid
lower wages locally. Thus, one way to reduce intra-rural inequality and poverty in remote
rural areas would be to facilitate labor mobility. However, such a policy must come
together with policies aiming at developing non-agricultural job opportunities in remote
areas, in order to avoid that remote areas be drained of their most efficient workers.
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Appendix A. Definition of explanatory variables
Variables Definition Unit
Individual characteristics
Age Number of years Year
Education Number of years of schooling (not including years spent on repeating
a grade)
Year
Experience Number of years since when the worker starts a non-agricultural ac-
tivity as his primary activity
Year
Party member Dummy equal to 1 if the worker is member of the Communist Party,
0 otherwise
Male Dummy equal to 1 if the worker is a man, 0 otherwise
Minority Dummy equal to 1 if the worker is an ethnic minority, 0 otherwise
Household characteristics
Land per capita Total amount of land possessed per capita in the household Mu
Village characteristics
Distance to town Distance from the nearest county seat Kilometers
Distance to city Dummy equal to 1 if the village is not a suburb of a large or middle
city, 0 otherwise
Road Dummy equal to 1 if a road reaches the village, 0 otherwise
Topography Variable equal to 1 if the village is located in a plain, 2 if in a hilly
area and 3 if in a mountainous area
Township Dummy equal to 1 if the township the village is in is a province level
poverty township
Living costs Average market price of six non-staple foods (meat, eggs, edible oil,
sugar, vegetables, fruit and melons) (in logarithm form)
Yuan
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Variable Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev.
Age 38.83 13.46 39.86 11.81 38.54 13.88
Education 7.07 2.77 7.91 2.57 6.83 2.78
Experience 2.07 4.90 6.01 7.49 0.96 3.05
Party member 0.08 0.27 0.17 0.37 0.06 0.23
Male 0.53 0.50 0.75 0.43 0.46 0.50
Minority 0.12 0.32 0.07 0.25 0.13 0.34
Land per capita 1.92 2.10 1.55 1.71 2.03 2.18
Distance to town 24.37 20.99 19.81 16.64 25.66 21.90
Distance to city 0.93 0.25 0.89 0.32 0.94 0.23
Road 0.96 0.19 0.97 0.18 0.96 0.19
Topography 1.73 0.77 1.63 0.74 1.76 0.78
Township 0.14 0.34 0.09 0.29 0.15 0.36
Living costs 4.65 0.60 4.69 0.58 4.63 0.61
Total 22652 4986 17666
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Table 1: Employment in rural China
Effective %
Agricultural workers 22427 89.29
Non-agricultural workers 9802 39.03
Of which: wage-earners 8414 33.50
Of which: local wage-earners 5325 21.20
Both agricultural and non-agricultural workers 7109 28.30
Total workers 25116 100
Table 2: Non-agricultural hourly wages and distance to towns and cities in rural China
1ary and 2ndary activities Only 1ary activity
Mean Std. Dev. Median Difference Mean Std. Dev. Median Difference
Distance to county seat
0-20 km 3.07 3.64 2.34 3.02 3.46 2.34
21-40 km 3.42 5.34 2.37 3.36 5.27 2.38
41-60 km 3.05 4.32 2.28 2.87 2.92 2.28
61-80 km 2.15 1.43 1.96 2.15 1.49 1.96
More than 80 km 2.58 1.77 2.21 2.33 1.47 2.14
Suburban village
Yes 3.51 4.70 2.50 0.44*** 3.47 4.71 2.50 0.46***
No 3.07 4.03 2.29 (-2.37) 3.01 3.77 2.29 (-2.58)
Note: *, **, *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively. t-statistics in parenthesis.
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Table 3: Urban proximity and local non-agricultural wages in rural China
1ary and 2ndary activities Only 1ary activity
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Selection Income Selection Income Selection Income Selection Income
Individual characteristics
Age 0.012*** 0.054*** 0.012*** 0.054*** 0.008*** 0.055*** 0.008*** 0.055***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Age2 -0.014*** -0.061*** -0.014*** -0.062*** -0.010*** -0.063*** -0.010*** -0.063***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Education 0.010*** 0.037*** 0.010*** 0.037*** 0.009*** 0.041*** 0.009*** 0.041***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Experience 0.043*** 0.052*** 0.043*** 0.050*** 0.037*** 0.065*** 0.037*** 0.063***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Experience2 -0.105*** -0.111*** -0.105*** -0.107*** -0.089*** -0.144*** -0.088*** -0.137***
(0.000) (0.003) (0.000) (0.003) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001)
Party member 0.079*** 0.180*** 0.078*** 0.175*** 0.064*** 0.202*** 0.064*** 0.196***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Male 0.137*** 0.349*** 0.138*** 0.352*** 0.113*** 0.388*** 0.114*** 0.389***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Minority -0.001 -0.043 -0.004 -0.050 -0.015 -0.047 -0.017 -0.055
(0.911) (0.375) (0.758) (0.310) (0.202) (0.386) (0.131) (0.312)
Village characteristics
Distance town -0.001*** -0.002* -0.001*** -0.001 -0.001*** -0.002** -0.001*** -0.002**
(0.000) (0.079) (0.000) (0.101) (0.000) (0.032) (0.000) (0.041)
Distance city -0.079*** -0.136*** -0.076*** -0.125*** -0.072*** -0.158*** -0.069*** -0.147***
(0.000) (0.003) (0.000) (0.005) (0.000) (0.002) (0.000) (0.004)
Road 0.037** 0.120** 0.034** 0.105* 0.047*** 0.207*** 0.044*** 0.193***
(0.014) (0.037) (0.022) (0.068) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003)
Topography 0.001 -0.019 -0.0004 -0.021 -0.006 -0.038** -0.007 -0.040**
(0.886) (0.275) (0.933) (0.231) (0.185) (0.045) (0.113) (0.035)
Township -0.048*** -0.168*** -0.044*** -0.153*** -0.030*** -0.188*** -0.025*** -0.172***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.006) (0.000)
Living costs 0.140*** 0.579*** 0.153*** 0.563***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Household characteristic
Land per capita -0.005*** -0.005*** -0.006*** -0.006***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.000)
Constant -2.889*** -1.490*** -3.827*** -2.433*** -2.589*** -1.915*** -3.682*** -2.824***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Mills ratio 0.361*** 0.354*** 0.521*** 0.509***
(0.004) (0.005) (0.001) (0.001)
Regional dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Provincial dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 22652 22652 22652 22652
Uncensored observations 4986 4986 4535 4535
P-value of Wald test 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Note: *, **, *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively. P-values in parenthesis.
For the selection model, the marginal effects at the mean values of the independent variables are given. The marginal effect gives
the change in the probability of participation given a small change in an explanatory variable (or given a change from 0 to 1 for a
dichotomous variable).
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Table 4: Robustness checks: controlling for endowments
Robustness check 1: county level dummies Robustness check 2: sectors that do not depend on NRa
1ary and 2ndary activities Only 1ary activity 1ary and 2ndary activities Only 1ary activity
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Selection Income Selection Income Selection Income Selection Income
Individual characteristics
Age 0.012*** 0.054*** 0.008*** 0.054*** 0.011*** 0.055*** 0.008*** 0.056***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Age2 -0.015*** -0.061*** -0.011*** -0.061*** -0.013*** -0.063*** -0.010*** -0.064***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Education 0.010*** 0.039*** 0.009*** 0.042*** 0.010*** 0.039*** 0.009*** 0.044***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Experience 0.041*** 0.049*** 0.035*** 0.057*** 0.041*** 0.051*** 0.035*** 0.063***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Experience2 -0.102*** -0.106*** -0.086*** -0.129*** -0.098*** -0.108*** -0.084*** -0.137***
(0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.003) (0.000) (0.001)
Party member 0.079*** 0.179*** 0.064*** 0.187*** 0.077*** 0.184*** 0.064*** 0.205***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Male 0.147*** 0.361*** 0.122*** 0.387*** 0.128*** 0.344*** 0.106*** 0.375***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Minority 0.006 0.060 0.002 0.055 0.004 -0.022 -0.011 -0.022
(0.704) (0.356) (0.915) (0.435) (0.724) (0.657) (0.337) (0.685)
Village characteristics
Distance town -0.002*** -0.002* -0.001*** -0.002** -0.001*** -0.001* -0.001*** -0.002**
(0.000) (0.051) (0.000) (0.024) (0.000) (0.084) (0.000) (0.031)
Distance city -0.067*** -0.170*** -0.051*** -0.172*** -0.075*** -0.123*** -0.068*** -0.143***
(0.000) (0.003) (0.002) (0.005) (0.000) (0.007) (0.000) (0.006)
Road 0.021 0.059 0.038** 0.121* 0.027* 0.098* 0.038*** 0.187***
(0.184) (0.316) (0.014) (0.064) (0.065) (0.089) (0.007) (0.004)
Topography 0.014* 0.037 0.014** 0.038 -0.006 -0.036** -0.012*** -0.059***
(0.059) (0.152) (0.049) (0.165) (0.186) (0.047) (0.007) (0.003)
Township -0.007 -0.073* 0.001 -0.106** -0.044*** -0.165*** -0.024*** -0.179***
(0.504) (0.092) (0.888) (0.021) (0.001) (0.000) (0.006) (0.000)
Living costs 0.102** 0.417** 0.107** 0.386** 0.146*** 0.573*** 0.156*** 0.549***
(0.029) (0.016) (0.015) (0.037) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Household characteristic
Land per capita -0.001 -0.002 -0.005*** -0.006***
(0.726) (0.217) (0.000) (0.000)
Constant -3.681*** -1.983** -3.597*** -2.222** -3.829*** -2.458*** -3.675*** -2.818***
(0.000) (0.015) (0.000) (0.011) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Mills ratio 0.359*** 0.472*** 0.365*** 0.513***
(0.002) (0.001) (0.005) (0.001)
Regional dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Provincial dummies No No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
County dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes No No No No
Observations 22652 22652 22652 22652
Uncensored observations 4986 4535 4853 4419
P-value of Wald test 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
a NR refers to natural resources.
Note: *, **, *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively. P-values in parenthesis.
For the selection model, the marginal effects at the mean values of the independent variables are given. The marginal effect gives the change
in the probability of participation given a small change in an explanatory variable (or given a change from 0 to 1 for a dichotomous variable).
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Table 5: Migrants and local workers
1ary and 2ndary activities Only 1ary activity
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Selection Income Selection Income Selection Income Selection Income
Individual characteristics
Age -0.011*** 0.048*** -0.010*** 0.045*** -0.014*** 0.043*** -0.014*** 0.042***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Age2 0.003* -0.054*** 0.003 -0.050*** 0.007*** -0.050*** 0.007*** -0.048***
(0.077) (0.000) (0.186) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Education 0.014*** 0.028*** 0.015*** 0.029*** 0.012*** 0.029*** 0.013*** 0.030***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Experience 0.091*** 0.040*** 0.091*** 0.041*** 0.077*** 0.050*** 0.076*** 0.045***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001)
Experience2 -0.245*** -0.091*** -0.244*** -0.096*** -0.206*** -0.118*** -0.205*** -0.109***
(0.000) (0.005) (0.000) (0.002) (0.000) (0.003) (0.000) (0.003)
Party member 0.077*** 0.123*** 0.082*** 0.117*** 0.054*** 0.131*** 0.058*** 0.114***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Male 0.217*** 0.261*** 0.227*** 0.260*** 0.178*** 0.278*** 0.187*** 0.265***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Minority -0.037** -0.087** -0.017 -0.028 -0.054*** -0.110*** -0.016 -0.045
(0.013) (0.022) (0.434) (0.587) (0.000) (0.009) (0.439) (0.400)
Village characteristics
Distance town -0.001*** 0.0003 -0.001*** 0.0001 -4.35e-04** 0.0003 -0.001** 0.0003
(0.000) (0.541) (0.000) (0.795) (0.026) (0.581) (0.021) (0.651)
Distance city -0.049*** -0.073** -0.041 -0.137*** -0.047*** -0.071* -0.018 -0.124**
(0.003) (0.043) (0.102) (0.005) (0.002) (0.062) (0.427) (0.014)
Road 0.024 0.195*** 0.038* 0.110** 0.037** 0.242*** 0.054*** 0.143***
(0.204) (0.000) (0.063) (0.016) (0.035) (0.000) (0.006) (0.004)
Topography 0.015** -0.021 0.019* 0.031 0.005 -0.028* 0.018* 0.032
(0.012) (0.147) (0.052) (0.152) (0.393) (0.070) (0.059) (0.148)
Township -0.014 -0.145*** 0.001 -0.071** 0.002 -0.154*** 0.006 -0.100***
(0.235) (0.000) (0.921) (0.020) (0.834) (0.000) (0.618) (0.002)
Living costs 0.004 0.377*** -0.065 0.317** 0.053 0.361*** -0.006 0.314**
(0.925) (0.000) (0.275) (0.014) (0.185) (0.000) (0.912) (0.018)
Household characteristic
Land per capita -0.009*** -0.004* -0.009*** -0.006**
(0.000) (0.073) (0.000) (0.014)
Constant -1.357*** -1.675*** -1.142* -1.302* -1.291*** -1.763*** -1.285** -1.352*
(0.000) (0.000) (0.051) (0.071) (0.000) (0.000) (0.026) (0.064)
Mills ratio 0.213*** 0.221*** 0.297*** 0.264***
(0.006) (0.003) (0.003) (0.006)
Regional dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Provincial dummies Yes Yes No No Yes Yes No No
County dummies No No Yes Yes No No Yes Yes
Observations 22652 22652 22652 22652
Uncensored observations 7726 7726 7136 7136
P-value of Wald test 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Note: *, **, *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively. P-values in parenthesis.
For the selection model, the marginal effects at the mean values of the independent variables are given. The marginal effect gives
the change in the probability of participation given a small change in an explanatory variable (or given a change from 0 to 1 for a
dichotomous variable).
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